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Dae-Young Kim
Korea Maritime Institute
Abstract Self management of natural resources has started to gain increasing attention as an alternative tool to command-and-control and market-based tools, but
the fundamental question remains: is self management economically beneficial such
that it should be promoted in the first place? This article uses a unique set of survey
data from South Korea and applies an empirical strategy to provide some of the first
quantitative evidence that self management is benefiting the fishermen. We find that
positive benefits of fishery self management—an increase in fishery revenue and
reduction in cost—are perceived by member fishermen, which is a good start considering the average number of years since the establishment of these self-management
groups is only about seven. Empirical results of the magnitude of change in profit
showed some consistent results, although the estimates were not as robust. These results suggest that the impact of fishery self management is still in progress. Thus, the
government should maintain its current position to support self management as the
country’s fishery management policy.
Key words Self management, club goods, matching methods, coastal fishery, South
Korea.
JEL Classification Codes Q22, D71.

Introduction
Self management of natural resources has started to gain increasing attention as an alternative tool to command-and-control and market-based tools (e.g., Cunningham and
Bostock 2005; Wilson, Nielsen, and Dengbol 2003; Ostrom et al. 2002; Townsend, Shotton, and Uchida 2008). Self management, in which natural resource users decide on the
rules, is said to have advantages over command-and-control in parts of the world where
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the government’s capacity is weak in enforcement and monitoring, or where it lacks
institutional capacity to implement a market-based tool, such as an individual transferable quota system. Self management of natural resources has been in existence for long
time—decades if not centuries—in many parts of the world. However, the concept was
rediscovered in the fisheries literature not so long ago (Jentoft 2003).
For self management of natural resources to be successful, however, the mere setting
of rules by the natural resource users is not sufficient. Based on the theory of clubs, the
group of natural resource users need to be “privileged” (Buchanan 1965); e.g., managing
the natural resource as a group needs to bring higher present value of benefits to its members than the status quo. This higher present value of benefits, therefore, is an incentive
constraint of forming and maintaining a self-management group.
Despite the importance of this incentive constraint, existing literature has not empirically examined the impact of forming a self-management group on profitability. This
is primarily due to the lack of adequate data. Large sample data on self management of
common pool resources is rarely available. Even if such a dataset is available, it often is
aggregated, cross-sectional and/or cross-country data, where the challenge to control for
heterogeneity among countries, let alone unobservables, can be overwhelming (Agrawal
2001). For these reasons, many previous empirical studies are conducted on specific
cases, often not focusing directly on the effect of self management but on how or if such
a resource management regime can be maintained (Gaspart and Seki 2003; Platteau
and Seki 2007; Schott et al. 2007). Thus, the critical question is left unanswered: is self
management economically beneficial to resource users such that they have incentives to
sustain the resource management regime?
To address this question, this article empirically investigates whether or not self
management has improved economic outcomes in the context of fishery management.
We examine the South Korean experience with coastal fisheries management. The advantages of studying Korean fishery self management are that a large number of groups have
formed in recent years, and the specific rules adopted by the groups and fishery characteristics vary across groups. At the same time, however, all of the groups function under the
same national fishery regulations and, to certain extent, share a common set of cultural
and social characteristics. These advantages enable us to utilize wide variation in key
fishery-related variables while controlling for other influential, but latent, disturbances.
The overall goal of this study is to quantify the effectiveness of self management and
its institutional arrangements on profitability of the small-scale fishing households in Korea. The principal contribution of this study is to provide empirical evidence of the impact
of self management on fishermen’s profitability. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first study to quantitatively identify the economic impact of a self-regulatory approach
of fish resources using data collected systematically at the individual resource user level,
consisting of both members and non-members of self-management groups.
To meet this goal, we capitalize on a unique setting in South Korea which has an appealing institutional setting to study these questions. In 2001, South Korea instituted a
policy to encourage voluntary self-management groups for fishery management. By 2007,
more than 580 groups had formed. The groups have a rich variation in terms of targeted
species and gear types. They also have introduced a variety of self-imposed rules; 25
rules were identified by the authors, ranging from effort coordination measures, fishing
operation restrictions, and quality control activities. At the same time, there still exist numerous fishermen who are not members of any self-management groups.
To understand the economic impact of forming these self-management groups, we
utilize a dataset from a survey that we designed and implemented to a total of 306 fishermen, including those who are members of self-management groups and those who are
not. In identifying the effect of membership in a self-management group, we control for
self selection by employing covariate matching method. Overall, we find strong evidence
that membership in a self-management group has benefits on both revenue and cost com-
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pared to non-members, but there is weaker evidence on the actual extent of the increase
in profitability.

Conceptual Framework: Theory of Clubs
Our conceptual framework is based on the theory of clubs (Buchanan 1965). A club is
defined as a group of individuals deriving mutual benefits from sharing a class of public
goods characterized by excludability and some rivalry in the form of congestion. The
theory shows that such impure public goods, which lie between private goods (with complete rivalry and costless exclusion) and pure public goods (complete non-rivalry and
infeasible exclusion), can be converted and provided as club goods. As such, a club is
viewed as a private, non-governmental alternative provider of such impure public goods.
Fish resources, unless managed under an individual quota scheme, are common
property resources and thus categorized as impure public goods. Unlike pure public
goods, fish harvest is subject to rivalry—fish that were harvested by one fisherman cannot
be harvested by someone else. If the fish resources have open access, they remain nonexcludable. With limited access, however, such as through licensing or establishment of
territorial user rights fisheries (TURF), fish resources can be made excludable to a varying degree. However, even with limited access and some excludability, fish resources can
still be subject to overexploitation. For example, if the number of incumbent fishermen
is too large—which is often the case—then non-excludability of the resources among
the license holders or TURF members creates incentive structure similar to that of open
access; i.e., race to fish. Race to fish will lead to overexploitation of the resources, overinvestment (capital stuffing), and rent dissipation.
One way to overcome overexploitation is to convert the fish resources to club goods.
If successfully converted to a club good, members of the club would reap a stream of
rents from the resources to which only the members have exclusive use rights. The size of
the club membership and the level of the resource stock will determine the optimum such
that the resource is used to sustain the rents over time. However, based on the theory of
clubs, three conditions need to hold in order to transform the resources into club goods.
First, fishing ground boundaries need to be defined in accordance to the ecology of the
targeted fish so that only members have exclusive use rights to the fish. Second, group
membership needs to be well-defined and controlled. Finally, and most importantly from
the perspective of this study, the groups need to be “privileged”; that is, forming a group
needs to bring higher present value of benefits to each member than nonmembers and the
status quo. The first two conditions are related to excludability, while the third is related
to profitability or an incentive compatibility constraint of forming and maintaining a club.
These conditions are also interrelated; whether a club is privileged or not depends on how
well the benefits are made exclusive to its members.
The excludability condition can be achieved in several ways. One example is the
license system, where membership is defined by the possession of a license. Another example is forming a fishermen’s group, such as cooperatives in Alaska and sectors in the
US Northeast groundfish fishery. In both examples, enforcement and monitoring of the
violators will become key to providing exclusive use rights successfully.
The privileged condition is the most challenging to meet. There are several ways
which clubs can bring higher profit to their members. Activities that could increase revenues or reduce costs often require some critical mass to be effective, or have a public good
nature so that no single individual will voluntarily pursue them. An example is reducing
harvest in order to rebuild the fish stock. This is effective only if done by most, if not all,
harvesters, and no single fisherman will do it voluntarily. Maintaining fishing grounds,
monitoring illegal fishing, sharing information on fishing spots and market prices, direct
marketing, and quality control are other measures that self-management groups may adopt
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to meet the privileged condition. These measures would be more successful if fishermen
coordinate as a group. Case studies from Japan and elsewhere demonstrate anecdotal evidence where combinations of these activities have brought higher profits to the cooperative
(club) members (e.g., Makino 2008; Uchida and Baba 2008; Uchida and Watanobe 2008).
A discussion on the feasibility of a self-management group—a club—and the type
of targeted species in fisheries is in order. The conventional wisdom is that the less mobile the species, the better the chance of successful self management (e.g., Ostrom et
al. 2002). Does this mean that migratory and pelagic species are ruled out? Anecdotal
evidence shows that this is not necessarily the case; examples include: UK’s Shetland
Fish Producers Organization targeting white fish (e.g., haddock, cod, hake, and monkfish)
(Anderson 2008), Cape Cod Commercial Hook Fishermen’s Association and Rhode Island Fluke Conservation Cooperative in the US targeting groundfish (e.g., Johnston and
Sutinen 2009), and Hiyama Walleye Pollack Long Line Association in Japan targeting
highly migratory pollack (Uchida and Watanobe 2008). There are two important points to
note. First, it is not the fish per se that needs to be exclusive, rather it is the benefit—economic returns to be specific—from the fishery. This explains why many self-management
groups engage in marketing activities such as quality control and developing a private
brand. Second, excludability need not be spillover proof. As long as the group members
receive higher net benefits than before formation of the group and compared to the current non-members, it is incentive compatible for members to maintain the group.
Lastly, with respect to the privileged condition, are low-valued species ruled out under this conceptual framework? Again, anecdotal evidence shows it is not necessarily so.
One example is the clam fishery on the central Pacific coast of Japan, where the average
annual revenue per fisherman is a mere 3 million yen (US$30,000). This is hardly enough
to support a family, yet this self-management group is one of the often-cited successful groups. The reason is that revenue from this clam fishery is very stable and reliable
compared to the shirasu (juvenile sardine) fishery, which was the group’s main revenue
source. It is the insurance-like benefit, not the revenue level, of this clam fishery that
maintains its self-management group.1 That said, such benefits and information are difficult to quantify or solicit through a survey. As such, in this study we attempt to identify
quantitatively the impact of self management on fishermen’s profitability.

Self Management of Fisheries in South Korea
South Korea provides a unique opportunity to study the impact of forming self-management groups on economic outcomes. As elsewhere, despite the government’s effort to
manage fisheries primarily through licensing and permit systems, Korea has still suffered
from the problems of “race-to-fish” and stock depletion (Cheong 2004). Profitability of
fisheries declined due to the vicious cycle of overcompetition, stock depletion, and capital
stuffing. Illegal fishing persisted and aggravated the stock depletion problem despite costly monitoring and enforcement efforts. Fishing grounds suffered from conflicts among
fishermen. Fishermen became prone to rely on government subsidy or other favorable
policies. Rising international competition with cheaper imported seafood led to lower
output prices. All of these conditions created a growing need for an alternative approach
to the traditional command-and-control.
In response, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries initiated a policy in 2001 to
encourage South Korean fishermen to form voluntary self-management groups and manage
fisheries through self-regulated regimes (jayul gwanry fishery). These groups are typically
established based on the fishing community organizations called ochongye. Under the new
From an interview conducted on 2005/10/14 with Dr. Akira Nihira of the Ibaraki Prefectural Freshwater Fisheries Research Institute.
1

Fishery Self Management in South Korea

41

policy, fishermen can voluntarily form self-management committees, propose a set of self
regulations to the government, and if approved, implement the rules. In response, the government gives stronger responsibility and authority to the groups to manage fishing grounds,
stocks, and harvests. In addition to administrative and technical support to implement the
self-management plans, the government also provides financial rewards to self-management
groups with good performance records to incentivize more fishermen to form groups. In
2007 the government provided 11.8 billion KW (US$9.8 million) to 90 self-management
groups (20% of the total number of self-management groups). These payments are made to
the groups and not to the individual members; the regulations require that the money be reinvested in self-management activities. Typically the groups spend the money for restocking
and business startup, such as direct-sale shops and restaurants.
Fisheries in South Korea can be categorized broadly into four types: maul, coastal,
offshore, and aquaculture (Lee, Gates, and Lee 2006). A maul fishery is one that manages
clams or other sedentary species in designated areas. Over 50% of the 579 self-management groups in 2007 were of this type (table 1). Coastal fisheries, which are the focus of
this article, involve fishing vessels of less than eight gross tons operating in areas where
fishermen fish and return to the departure port within a day. Eighteen percent of the selfmanagement groups are associated with coastal fisheries, and another 16% are those
engaged in both maul and coastal fisheries. Offshore fisheries involve fishing vessels
greater than eight gross tons operating in areas where fishermen fish and return to the departure port within two or three days. Offshore fisheries typically target highly migratory
species and often compete with foreign vessels. While a few self-management groups exist in offshore fisheries, because of these distinctive characteristics they are not included
in our analysis. Lastly, 12% of the self-management groups are engaged in aquaculture.
As a result of government policy that promotes self management, the number of such
groups and their members grew rapidly (table 1). Starting from 63 groups in 2001, by
2007 the total number of self-management groups had grown to 579. The number of participating fishermen has also steadily increased from 5,407 in 2001 to 10,765 in 2003 and
44,061 in 2007. Currently, the average number of member fishermen in each community
is about 70 to 80. The government aims to establish 1,000 self-management groups by
2011 and in all of approximately 2,000 fishing communities after 2012. Despite the rapid
expansion in the number of self-management groups, however, there is little evidence on
the economic performance of this new approach to fisheries management.

Data and Descriptive Characteristics
We use a dataset from surveys that we designed and implemented in 2008. The surveys
were conducted among leaders of self-management groups and individual fishermen,
which included both members and non-members of such groups. This dataset is believed
to be the only existing dataset that includes individual fishermen of both members and
non-members of self-management groups in South Korea. The descriptive statistics for
the key variables discussed here are shown in tables 2 through 4.
The group leader survey employed a stratified sampling strategy designed to collect data on a sample of 33 group leaders engaged in coastal fisheries.2 As of December
2007, there were 102 self-management groups engaged in coastal fisheries (Ministry of
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 2008). Of these, we were able to obtain a contact list of
92 groups. Among them, 30 self-management groups were established in or after 2006.
Due to a concern that two years would be too short of a time period to detect the impact
of group establishment, we excluded those groups from the sampling frame and focused
The secretary general of the self-management group responded to the survey when he/she was most knowledgeable about the fishery's management.
2

8
12
–
63

Coastal fishery

Combined fishery

Inland fishery

Total number of self-management groups

Source: Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (2008).
Note: The numbers are cumulative.

Average number of members per group

81

5,107

11

Aquaculture

Total number of fishermen with membership

32

Maul fishery

2001

83

6,575

79

–

13

19

12

35

2002

88

10,765

122

–

17

29

15

61

2003

89

15,469

174

–

26

34

22

92

2004

308

8

43

52

46

159

2005

81

24,805

Table 1
Growth of Self-management Groups in South Korea, 2001-2007

76

33,921

455

9

62

71

70

233

2006

76

44,061

579

17

94

102

72

294

2007
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on self-management groups that have been active for at least three years at the time of the
survey. Of the remaining groups, we then focused our sampling frame on fisheries types
for which we could find comparable fishermen who were engaged in the same fisheries
in the same region but were not a member of any self-management group. As a result, we
dropped 27 self-management groups in the net fishery and king crab fishery since there
were few or no fishermen who were engaged in these fisheries but not a member of any
self-management group. Of the remaining 35 groups, leaders of two groups refused to respond to the survey. We, therefore, received 33 valid responses from group leaders.
To enlist the fishermen from these 33 groups for individual surveys, ideally we would
construct a sampling frame from a list of all fishermen in those groups and a list of all
fishermen who are not members of those groups but are engaging in the same fisheries in
the same fishing community (ochongye). Such lists, however, do not exist. As an alternative, we asked each leader to give us a list of fishermen from two categories: those who are
members of the self-management group and non-members who are in the same fisheries
in the same community. Of the 33 group leaders, 32 of them provided contact information
for one or more fishermen. However, leaders of seven groups could not provide any nonmember information, since most or all of the fishermen in their fishing communities were
already members. In these cases, we selected fishing communities that were geographically the closest to each self-management group. Some groups included an equal number
of both member and non-member fishermen; others included fishermen in only one of the
categories. In our data, seven groups include only fishermen who are members of a selfmanagement group. This sampling strategy and the resulting imbalance of member and
non-member fishermen representing each group motivated our identification strategy.
In the end, we obtained individual data from 182 fishermen who were members of
one of the 33 self-management groups in the survey (hereafter called “member fishermen”)
and 124 fishermen who were not a member of any self-management group (hereafter
called “non-member fishermen”) from 64 different fishing communities or fishery associations. The survey instruments were pretested and revised prior to full implementation. The
survey was conducted by telephone by experienced and trained enumerators. The response
rate was approximately 70%. A caveat of our data set is the potential recall bias in the information for the period before engaging in self-management groups. However, there is no
individual-level data available from the period prior to the policy due to the government’s
quick decision to implement the program. We designed the survey carefully and trained
and monitored the enumerators to minimize recall bias and ensure that the best account of
past amounts and activities was given by the respondents.

Characteristics of the Self-management Groups
Based on the group leader survey data, we find that self-management groups among
coastal fisheries in South Korea adopt various ways to provide excludability and incentive
compatibility to their members (table 2). The types of rules can be grouped into four categories: agreements on effort coordination, operational restrictions, revenue sharing, and
quality control measures. Among the different types of agreements on effort coordination,
several activities are adopted by a high percentage of the interviewed self-management
groups: cleaning the fishing ground (94%), monitoring illegal fishing (70%), removing
harmful species (70%), and information exchange (64%). More than half of the groups
engaged in a joint search for hot spots and restocking of targeted fish. Eight groups also
either assign or rotate fishing grounds. Self-management groups have adopted a number
of operational restrictions as well. The most popular measures are size/age limits and
seasonal closures, which are adopted by more than two-thirds of the groups. Nearly half
of the groups control mesh size, the number of fishing gear, aggregate supply, duration
of fishing operations, and designation of protected areas. Finally, some groups also have
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Table 2
Number and Proportion of Self-management Groups in the Sample
Adopting Specific Rules, 2007

		

Number of Groups

Proportion of Total
Groups Surveyed (%)

Agreements on Effort Coordination
Cleaning fishing ground

31

94

Monitoring of illegal fishing

23

70

Removing harmful species

23

70

Information exchange

21

64

Joint search for hot spots

17

52

Restocking

17

52

Establishing artificial reefs

16

48

Assign/rotate fishing grounds

8

24

Agreements on Operational Restrictions		
Size/age limit

22

67

Seasonal closure

22

67

Mesh size

16

48

Number of fishing gear

16

48

Supply control

15

45

Operating hours limit

15

45

Operating days limit

15

45

Protected area

15

45

Total catch limit

14

42

Fishing gear type

11

33

Other restrictions on fishing gear

7

21

Gross tonnage

6

18

Number of fishing vessels

5

15

Revenue Sharing		
Revenue sharing among group members

1

3

Quality Control		
Joint marketing

15

45

Quality control of catch

8

24

Development of new products

5

15

Total number of groups

33

Source: Authors’ survey.
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adopted quality control measures. Nearly half of the groups coordinate marketing of their
fish (45%) and a quarter of them conduct quality control of their catch (24%). A few also
jointly develop new products (15%). Only one self-management group in our sample adopted some sort of a revenue sharing rule among group members.
Interestingly, the 33 self-management groups in our sample adopt unique combinations of rules; i.e., none of the groups have the same combination of rules. For this reason,
we unfortunately cannot identify the impact of a specific rule or a combination of rules on
the economic outcomes. Therefore, in the rest of the article, we will examine the impact
of self-management groups as a whole on economic outcomes.
The group leader survey revealed an interesting set of characteristics of the selfmanagement groups engaged in coastal fisheries (table 3). The group size is around 71
fishermen, which is comparable to the national average (table 1, last row). On average,
52 vessels go out on an average fishing day, suggesting that some boats are operated by
more than one member. Their vessel size is relatively small, an average of 7.4 tons. In 24
self-management groups in our sample, there are fishermen in the same community who
are engaged in the same fisheries but are not members of the self-management group. In
roughly one-third of the groups (10 groups), all members of the community engaged in the
same fisheries as members of the self-management group. However, among the remaining two-thirds, the number of fishermen not participating in the self-management group is
213, on average, with a wide range of from 5 to 4,000. The average number of years since
establishment is seven, suggesting that many of these groups were established at the time
of the government policy in 2001 which introduced monetary incentives for fishermen to
form self-management groups. Membership in a self-management group was voluntary
for most fishermen in our sample (94%). This finding implies that we would need to control for self-selection bias in estimating the impact of group membership. Although most
groups do not make membership mandatory, more than 60% of the groups require some
sort of a membership fee. Of eight groups that gave a valid answer to the question regarding the level of membership fee, the average was 98 thousand KW (US$1=1,720 KW).
Compared to the average total revenue of fishermen who are members of a self-management group (60 million KW), the membership fee can be considered modest.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of the Self-management Groups, 2007
Sample Mean (standard deviation)
Number of fishermen in the self-management group

70.70 (61.69)

Number of fishermen in the ochongye who are in the
same fisheries but not in the self-management group

212.66 (762.99)

Average age of fishermen

51.29 (6.08)

Total number of vessels on an average fishing day

52.09 (50.03)

Average tonnage of vessels in the self-management group

7.41 (11.79)

Number of years since establishment of the self-management group

6.68 (4.27)

Percent of groups in which the members have the
autonomy of whether or not to join the group

93.75 (0.25)

Percent of groups that require a membership fee
Average membership fee (1,000 KW)*

60.61 (0.50)
97.50 (175.40)

Source: Authors’ data. Notes: The total number of group leaders interviewed was 33. Valid responses for each question vary within a range of 29–33. * Does not include zero values. US$1 is approximately 1,160 Korean won (KW).
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Profitability
Based on the descriptive statistics, the two types of fishermen are also statistically similar
in terms of economic outcomes. The average total revenue in 2007 was approximately
65 million KW and the total cost was 35 million KW, with no statistically significant
difference between the member and non-member fishermen (table 4, rows 1 and 2). We
find that both types of fishermen, on average, experienced a decrease in revenue and
an increase in cost since joining a self-management group or since 2002 in the case of
non-members (table 4, rows 3 and 4).3 Using the full sample, nearly 75% of the member fishermen said their total revenue decreased since joining a self-management group,
whereas about 85% of the non-members said their total revenue decreased since 2002.
On average, the direction of the change in revenue is negative for both groups, with more
non-member fishermen experiencing a decline. Likewise, although both groups experienced an increase in total cost, more non-member fishermen experienced an increase
in cost. The difference in means for the restricted sample, which is a subset of the full
sample that responded to all questions pertaining to the economic outcomes, was statistically significant at the 20% level for the directional change in total revenue and 10% for
the directional change in total cost. Otherwise, we find that there are no significant differences between fishermen in the restricted sample and those not in the restricted sample
except for income; the restricted sample has a higher mean income category compared to
the full sample.
Although the direction of change in revenues and costs over the years is informative when evaluating the effect of joining a self-management group, a caveat with these
variables is that the baseline year is different among fishermen. For all non-member fishermen, the baseline year is 2002. For member fishermen, the reference year is one year
prior to joining a self-management group, which differs depending to which of the 33
groups the fisherman belongs. Still, the reference year for 70% of the member fishermen
in our sample is either 2001 or 2002, implying that the reference year for most fishermen
in our sample is similar, but the issue of different base years still remains.
For a better comparison, we utilize the information on changes in total revenue and
total cost in the reference year compared to 2007 and create new variables that indicate
the annual growth rate in total profit, revenue, and cost (table 4, rows 5 through 7). We
find that both types of fishermen experienced a high growth rate per year in profit, with
an average of 33% per year for member fishermen and 38% for non-member fishermen.
Not only did the revenue increased on average, but the total cost decreased. The average
growth rate in total revenue was 2.0% for member fishermen and 2.4% for non-member
fishermen, and the average growth rate in total cost was –7.5% for member fishermen and
–6.1% for the non-member fishermen. At first look, these trends seem somewhat contradictory compared to the directional change in costs and revenues (rows 3 and 4). This
result could stem from the possibility that the fishermen who responded to these questions
may have experienced a larger increase in revenue and a larger decrease in costs than the
full sample. In fact, the downside of these annual growth rate indicators is that only a
subset of the respondents provided valid responses to the questions related to changes in
revenues and costs in the baseline year. Given the advantages and disadvantages of these
two sets of economic outcome indicators—directional change and annual growth rate—
we utilize both of them in the subsequent analyses.

In our survey, we wanted to capture the change in revenue and cost before and after joining a self-management
group. We requested 2007 revenue and cost data from all fishermen. However, given that fishermen joined
self-management groups in different years, we asked each fisherman to consider one year prior to joining a selfmanagement group and asked for the revenue and cost information for that year. For the non-member fishermen,
we asked for revenue and cost information for 2007 and 2002.
3
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics of Fishermen’s Performance, Fishing Activities,
and Socioeconomic Characteristics Using Sampling Weights
Self-management vs. Non Self-management Fishermen, 2007
				

Self-management Group
Members

Non-members

				
				

Full Restricted Full Restricted
Sample Sample† Sample Sample†
(N=182) (N=63) (N=136) (N=39)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Average total fishery revenue in 2007
(million KW)

61.00
(11.51)

66.62
(14.32)

68.59
(10.26)

86.76
(13.87)

Average total fishery cost in 2007
(million KW)

30.14
(7.07)

35.96
(9.83)

40.84
(6.35)

52.27
(9.48)

Changes in revenue since 2002 or joining
self-management groupa
(1=increased, 0=no change, –1= decrease)

–0.40
(0.17)

–0.20
(0.14)

–0.59
(0.10)

–0.47
(0.15)

Changes in costs since 2002 or joining
self-management groupa
(1=increased, 0=no change, –1=decrease)

0.66
(0.10)

0.74
(0.09)

0.81
(0.06)

0.91
(0.05)

Average annual growth rate in profit since 2002
N.A.
or joining self-management group (% change per year)		

33.11
N.A.
(8.07)		

37.82
(11.29)

Average annual growth rate in revenue since 2002
N.A.
or joining self-management group (% change per year)		

2.00
N.A.
(1.22)		

2.38
(1.22)

Average annual growth rate in cost since 2002
N.A.
or joining self-management group (% change per year)		

–7.51
N.A.
(1.07)		

–6.08
(0.22)

Tonnage (tons)

5.23
(1.01)

5.04
(0.80)

4.43
(0.49)

5.17
(0.80)

Number of crew (persons)

2.39
(0.28)

2.14
(0.27)

2.82
(0.32)

2.75
(0.33)

Annual fishing days in 2007

198.65
(6.00)

200.98
(16.32)

198.81
(7.07)

199.17
(8.67)

Percentage of income from fishing

92.36*
(2.72)

92.57
(2.78)

85.59
(3.00)

85.65
(3.08)

Years of fishing experience

27.16
(1.07)

24.68
(1.95)

25.87
(1.42)

28.54
(2.37)

Income categoryb

3.74
(0.25)

4.14
(0.32)

3.80
(0.24)

4.18
(0.32)

Education attainmentc

2.10
(0.13)

2.08
(0.15)

2.02
(0.12)

1.82
(0.10)
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Table 4 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics of Fishermen’s Performance, Fishing Activities,
and Socioeconomic Characteristics Using Sampling Weights
Self-management vs. Non Self-management Fishermen, 2007

				

Self-management Group
Members

				
				

						

Non-members

Full Restricted Full Restricted
Sample Sample† Sample Sample†
(N=182) (N=63) (N=136) (N=39)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Age

53.70
(0.81)

53.33
(0.92)

54.95
(0.93)

55.54
(1.79)

Household size

2.97
(0.14)

3.11
(0.33)

2.68
(0.15)

2.74
(0.21)

Number of children (<18 years old)

0.48
(0.15)

0.67
(0.23)

0.67
(0.13)

0.68
(0.23)

Number of household members older than 65

0.37
(0.06)

0.36
(0.17)

0.26
(0.05)

0.31
(0.10)

Source: Authors’ survey.
Notes: Linearized standard error in parentheses. * The difference in means is significant at the 10% level based
on a one-tailed t-test. All other mean comparisons were statistically insignificant. The means are weighted using inverse probability. The number of sampled fishermen in a self-management group is 182; those not in a
self-management group is 124. The number of valid responses differs depending on the variable. For the selfmanagement group members, revenues and costs are from the managed fisheries only, but not necessarily for a
single species. “Household” is the typical unit of business in coastal fisheries, and thus the revenue and costs are
those at the household level. For non-members, the revenues and costs are from the fisheries that generated the
largest revenue for non-members. † The means are calculated only among respondents who answered both revenue and cost and changes thereof over the years (63 self-management fishermen and 39 non self-management
fishermen.) a Although insignificant at the 10% level, the absolute value of t-statistics testing the difference
between the two groups (restricted sample) in the means for change in total revenue was 1.31 (P-value=0.20)
and for total cost was 1.66 (P-value=0.103). b The income categories are (in million KW): 1 <10 ; 2=10 to <20;
3=20 to <30; 4=30 to <40; 5=40 to <50; 6=50 to <60; 7=60 to <70; 8=70 to <80; 9=80 to <100; and 10=>100.
c
Education categories are 1 = middle school graduate; 2 = some high school; 3 = high school graduate; 4 = professional college graduate; 5 = some college; and 6 = college graduate.

Descriptive Statistics: Members vs. Non-members
The individual-level fisherman survey revealed that members and non-members of a
self-management group share a number of similar characteristics (table 4). There is no
statistically significant difference in the key fishing characteristics, including average
tonnage of vessels, number of crew members, and effort measured by total fishing days
in 2007 (rows 8 to 10). The fishermen in our sample operate vessels of 4 to 5 tons. These
vessels are slightly smaller than the group average derived from the group leader survey.
Moreover, the member and non-member fishermen also share similar socioeconomic
characteristics, including years of fishing experience, income level, education attainment, age, household size, number of children, and number of household members over
54 years old. The only characteristic that was significantly different at the 10% level was
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percentage of income from fishing, with member fishermen, on average, having a share
of more than 90% of income from fishing, compared to 86% for non-member fishermen.
These common characteristics suggest that the two types of fishermen are comparable,
which is an appropriate condition for identifying the impact of self-management groups
on economic outcomes.
To further understand the factors associated with membership in a self-management
group, we compare results from two logit models (table 5). The dependent variable is
a binary indicator of if the respondent is a member of a self-management group or not.
Note that these logit models are for descriptive purposes rather than to identify causal
effects. Model 1 includes variables related to socioeconomic characteristics of the fishermen, fisheries characteristics, and regional fixed effects. Model 2 includes perception
questions regarding the current status of their fisheries.
Overall, there are two key findings. On one hand, many of the coefficients are insignificant, suggesting that the fishermen from the two groups are somewhat similar. This
supports comparability of these fishermen. On the other hand, there are several variables
that are associated with membership, which suggests that the two types of fishermen differ in some aspects and that they need to be controlled for when examining the effects
of self management on economic outcomes. Based on Model 2, we find that fishermen
that have lower incomes are younger, have more years of fishing experience, and are
more likely to be members of a self-management group. Moreover, fishermen using trap
nets are more likely to be a member compared to “other” gears (the dropped category).
Fishermen who target shellfish are less likely to be members compared to those who
target finfish. Some perceptions also are associated with group membership. Individuals
who think there is capital stuffing and oversupply (and resulting price decrease) are more
likely to be members. In our subsequent analyses, which identify the effect of self-management groups on economic outcomes, we control for all of these variables, except the
perception questions.4

Empirical Strategy
In an ideal world, we can identify the impact of self-management groups on economic
outcomes using the following model:
yi = β0 + β1selfmgti + εi,

(1)

where yi is an economic outcome for an individual fisherman i; selfmgti is a dummy variable indicating 1 if the individual fisherman is a member of a self-management group and
0 otherwise; and εi is the error term. The coefficient of interest is β1.

Selection Bias
There are three key problems in identifying β1.The first key issue is self-selection bias.
Since individual fishermen were not randomized into a self-management group, there
could be systematic differences between those who did and those who did not become
members of a self-management group that lead to differences in profitability. Although
the descriptive statistics shown in the previous section indicated that member and nonmember fishermen are similar in most aspects, the results from the logit models showed
We exclude the perception questions from the matching models since they ask about the current conditions of
their fishery.
4
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Table 5
Factors of Membership in a Self-management Group Based on Logit Model
Dependent Variable: 1=Member of a
Self-management Group; 0=Otherwise
Model 1

Model 2

Income category§

–0.025
(1.26)

–0.053**
(2.10)

Education attainment§

0.016
(0.50)

0.025
(0.73)

Age

–0.012**
(2.16)

–0.018**
(2.29)

Proportion of income from fishery

0.005**
(2.02)

0.003
(0.95)

Total fishing days in 2007

–0.000
(0.19)

–0.000
(0.09)

Years of experience in fishing

0.007*
(1.73)

0.009**
(2.08)

Tonnage in 2007

0.027
(1.31)

0.034
(1.51)

Number of crew in 2007

–0.027
(1.02)

–0.033
(1.19)

Gill net

0.104
(0.57)

0.064
(0.31)

Trap net

0.361***
(3.60)

0.366***
(3.83)

0.230
(1.36)

0.224
(1.12)

–0.222
(1.36)

–0.227
(1.35)

–0.550***
(3.06)

–0.468**
(1.87)

Gear Type Variables†

Composite fishery
Species Variables†
Crustacean
Shellfish
Other

0.216
(1.63)
Region Variables†		

0.171
(1.27)

Southeast region

0.007
(0.04)

–0.126
(0.59)

North region

0.0047
(0.25)

–0.080
(0.44)

Resource stock is low due to overharvesting		
		

–0.052
(1.05)

Overall fishing effort is declining		
		

0.051
(1.04)

There is overinvestment in vessels and gears		
		

0.104**		
(2.01)
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Table 5
Factors of Membership in a Self-management Group Based on Logit Model
Dependent Variable: 1=Member of a
Self-management Group; 0=Otherwise
Model 1

Model 2

Income category§

–0.025
(1.26)

–0.053**
(2.10)

Education attainment§

0.016
(0.50)

0.025
(0.73)

Age

–0.012**
(2.16)

–0.018**
(2.29)

Proportion of income from fishery

0.005**
(2.02)

0.003
(0.95)

Total fishing days in 2007

–0.000
(0.19)

–0.000
(0.09)

Years of experience in fishing

0.007*

0.009**

that some socioeconomic characteristics (lower income, younger, and more fishing experience) and fishery characteristics (using trap net and targeting species other than shellfish) are
positively associated with membership. These factors could affect economic outcomes. For
example, those with more fishing experience might have higher revenue and lower costs; this
could lead to a positive selection bias. Fishermen using trap nets may have lower productivity and hence lower revenue, leading to a negative selection bias. Although the combined
effect of selection bias is an empirical question, it is unlikely to be zero. Hence, applying
ordinary least squares to equation (1) is unlikely to yield an unbiased treatment effect.
To deal with self-selection bias, we utilize the covariate matching method. This method
is used to examine the impact of a treatment (in our context, membership in a self-management group) on an outcome (in our case, profit, revenue, and cost) when selection takes
place on observable characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Measuring the effect of
group membership on economic outcome without bias using the matching method assumes
that the outcome in the base state (economic outcome if the fisherman is not a member
of a group) is independent of the treatment (being a member of a group), conditional on
observed covariates. In other words, for fishermen within subgroups defined by the covariates, being a member of a self-management group is unrelated to what the economic
outcome would be if the fisherman were not a member. This is the so-called Conditional
Independence Assumption. If this assumption holds, we can say that given the observable
covariates, the economic outcome of the non-member fishermen is what the economic outcome of the member fishermen would have been had they not been a member.
Matching works by finding a non-member fisherman who is very similar to a member
fisherman by conditioning on covariate variables nonparametrically (Black and Smith 2004).
Moreover, with matching methods, we can impose “common support,” which excludes member fishermen for whom we cannot reliably find a similar non-member fisherman.
We follow the recent literature and match using covariate matching and its variants.5
Covariate matching matches directly on covariates. In our analysis, we choose to match
the two nearest neighbors with the same (similar) covariates (Zi). The member and nonmember fishermen are matched on income, educational attainment, age, proportion of
income from fishing, annual fishing days, tonnage, size of crew, region, gear type, and target
Using the Monte Carlo simulation, Zhao (2004) showed that with small sample size (500 or less), covariate
matching is preferred over propensity score matching.
5

52

Uchida, Uchida, Lee, Ryu, and Kim

species. In particular, we do exact matching on region, gear type, and target species, since
we believe the fishermen would be quite different if these characteristics were not similar.
Within this group, we can then directly estimate E(y1i|selfmgti=1, Zi) and E(y0i|selfmgti=0,
Zi), where the second term replaces the hypothetical counterfactual, E(y0i|selfmgti=1). This
approach means that once we have a matched sample, we compare the economic outcome
of the member fishermen with the economic outcome of the non-member fishermen.
We report the estimated coefficients that use the post-matching bias correction factor
developed by Abadie and Imbens (2006). This correction factor is needed to correct for
the conditional bias in finite samples when there are three or more continuous variables.
Based on recent work that demonstrates that bootstrapping standard errors are invalid with
non-smooth nearest neighbor estimators, we use Abadie and Imbens’s variance formula for
nearest-neighbor estimators that are heteroskedasticity consistent. With covariate matching, we report the results using two weighting matrices. One approach uses the inverse
variance weighting scheme; the other uses the Mahalanobis metric weighting scheme.
To further control for unobserved covariates that may affect membership or the
economic outcomes, we take advantage of the recall data for the baseline year and first
difference the variables in equation (1). We, therefore, examine five different variables as
economic outcomes (Δyi): directional change in total revenue and total cost and annual
growth rate in profit, total revenue, and total cost. First differencing the membership status will result in a dummy variable for selfmgti because, by definition, the baseline year is
the one in which self management was established. This differencing procedure yields the
so-called difference-in-difference matching, which controls for time-invariant unobserved
variables that change in parallel between the member and non-member fishermen in addition to all the advantages of the matching method.

Unequal Sampling Probability
Due to the way the member and non-member fishermen were sampled, each fisherman
has a different probability of being selected into our sample. The number of fishermen
in each self-management group differs; therefore, the probability of a member fisherman
being selected is inversely proportional to the size of the group. Moreover, the community size from which a non-member fisherman was sampled also differs. To take into
account this unequal sampling probability, we weight the samples based on the inverse
of the probability using the total number of fishermen in the self-management group or
the fishing community to which the fisherman belongs. The size of the self-management
group was determined by data from the group leader survey. The 2007 data for size of the
fishing community from which the non-member fishermen were sampled came from unpublished data through the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (2008). We show
both the weighted and unweighted estimates.

Two Measures of Self-management Effect
We are interested in two types of effects of self management on profitability: the average
treatment on the treated (ATT) and the average treatment effect (ATE). ATT measures
the effect of a self-management group on the profitability of the member fishermen. In
other words, it quantifies how much better off the self-management members are than
they would have been if they had not become a member. ATT can be expressed as E[y1i–
y0i|selfmgti=1]. In contrast, the ATE, which is expressed as E[y1i–y0i], measures the effect
of self-management group on the entire sample; i.e., unconditional on membership status.
In summary, we have five economic outcomes of interest: directional changes in total
revenue and total cost and the average growth rate in profit, total revenue, and total cost. For
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each of these outcomes, we show the estimates that use inverse distance and Mahalanobis
metrics for matching. In addition, we show both ATT and ATE for all outcomes and weighted and unweighted estimates. In total, we show estimates from 40 matching models.

Results
Directional Change in Total Revenue and Cost
The covariate matching estimates for the effect of self management on directional changes in revenue and cost suggest that being members of a self-management group benefits
both the revenue and cost sides of fishing activities (table 6). The ATT estimates for total
revenue suggest that when we compare member and non-member fishermen who are
similar or exactly the same in the covariates, membership in a self-management group is
likely to lead to an increase in revenue (columns 1 and 2). Moreover, the ATT estimates
for total cost are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that membership in
a self-management group is also likely to lead to a decrease in cost (columns 3 and 4).
These results are generally consistent regardless of the metrics used for matching (inverse
distance vs. Mahalanobis), weighted or unweighted using sampling weights.
The ATE estimates show that the benefits arising from forming or becoming a member of self-management groups may also extend to non-member fishermen, but more
so for revenue than cost. The ATE estimates for the directional change in total revenue
are positive and significant, and the magnitudes are similar to ATT (columns 5 and 6).
This result suggests that, on average, the matched non-member fishermen could benefit
as much as the member fishermen in terms of higher revenue had they also become a
member. The ATE estimates for directional change in total cost give a mixed result. The
weighted estimates are negative and significant, suggesting that self-management membership will lower the cost for an average fisherman. However, the unweighted estimates
are insignificant, suggesting that the unconditional effect of self management is zero.
Again, these results are consistent across the two metrics, inverse distance and Mahalanobis metric. We believe that weighted estimates are more accurate given our sampling
strategy; thus, it is more likely that the cost of fishing will decrease as a result of becoming a member of a self-management group.

Average Growth Rate in Profit, Total Revenue, and Cost
When we examine the degree of change in profit, total revenue, and total cost, we find
results that are consistent with the effect on directional change, although the estimates are
not as statistically robust (table 7). The ATT estimates for the average growth rate in profit
are positive, ranging from 16 to 23% (top table, columns 1 and 2). While the magnitude
of the effect of self management on member fishermen is large, the estimates are significant only at 10–20% significance level. When we break this down into revenue and cost,
the ATT estimates for the average growth rate in total revenue ranged from 4 to 5%, and
the estimates were statistically significant at the 1% level for the weighted estimates (columns 3 and 4). On the other hand, the estimates for the average growth rate in total cost
are insignificant (weighted) or only weakly significant (unweighted) (columns 5 and 6).
The ATE estimates show that the self management had no unconditional effect on
overall growth in profit or revenue, but the estimates on total cost show that self management had small unconditional effects in reducing costs (lower table, columns 1 to 6). The
estimates range from –1.5 to –1.9% annual reductions in costs, and the results are consistent across the two metrics for matching and weighted and unweighted.

0.216
(1.14)

Mahalanobis
		

0.282**
(2.20)

0.288**
(2.23)
–0.196***
(2.75)

–0.226 ***
(–3.13)
–0.165*
(1.69)

0.120
(1.21)
0.227*
(1.85)

0.311**
(2.72)

Weighted
(5)

0.291***
(2.81)

0.284***
(2.68)

Unweighted
(6)

Change in Total Revenue
(1=positive, 0=no change,
–1=negative)

–0.094*
(1.86)

–0.116**
(–1.97)

Weighted
(7)

–0.095
(1.06)

0.071
(0.80)

Unweighted
(8)

Change in Total Cost
(1=positive, 0=no change,
–1=negative)

Average Treatment Effect (ATE)

Notes: N = 262. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All estimates use bias-corrected matching estimator. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent. Each treated sample is matched against two control samples using nearest neighbor matching based on the covariates income, education,
age, proportion of income from fishing, effort, tonnage, and the number of crew. The treated and control samples are exact matched based on primary target species, gear type, and
region. Estimates in columns labeled “weighted” are weighted using sampling weights; i.e., the inverse of the probability that the observation is included due to sampling.

0.354**
(2.03)

Unweighted
(4)

Weighted
(3)

Weighted
(1)

Unweighted
(2)

Change in Total Cost
(1=positive, 0=no change,
–1=negative)

Change in Total Revenue
(1=positive, 0=no change,
–1=negative)

Inverse distance
		

Dependent Variable

Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)

Table 6
Estimated Effect of Self Management on the Direction of Change in Total Revenue and Total Cost from Covariate Matching Models
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–1.072
(0.13)

Mahalanobis

14.716
(1.31)

14.937
(1.24)

(2)

Unweighted

4.038
(1.55)

4.317
(1.60)

(4)

Unweighted

1.562
(0.90)

–0.506
(0.24)

(3)

Weighted

3.142
(1.22)

2.670
(0.99)

(4)

Unweighted

% Change per Year in Total Revenue

Average Treatment Effect (ATE)

5.010***
(2.97)

5.369***
(3.10)

(3)

Weighted

% Change per Year in Total Revenue

–1.059
(1.39)

–1.071
(1.41)

(6)

Unweighted

–1.498**
(1.96)

–1.454*
(1.91)

(5)

Weighted

–1.818**
(2.23)

–1.866**
(2.32)

(6)

Unweighted

% Change per Year in Total Cost

–0.071
(0.02)

–0.015
(0.02)

(5)

Weighted

% Change per Year in Total Cost

Notes: N=103. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All estimates use bias-corrected matching estimator. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent. Each treated sample is matched against two control samples using nearest neighbor matching based on the covariates income, education,
age, proportion of income from fishing, effort, tonnage, and the number of crew. The treated and control samples are exact matched based on primary target species, gear type, and
region. Estimates in columns labeled “weighted” are weighted using sampling weights; i.e., the inverse of the probability that the observation is included due to sampling.

–1.592
(0.19)

(1)

Weighted

Inverse distance

					

% Change per Year in Profit

Dependent variable

17.688
(1.38)

15.835
(1.46)

Mahalanobis

22.976*
(1.72)

(2)

Unweighted

16.901
(1.51)

(1)

Weighted

% Change per Year in Profit

Inverse distance

					

Dependent Variable

Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)

Table 7
Estimated Effect of Self-management on Changes in Average Growth per Year in Profit, Total Revenue, and Total Cost
from Covariate Matching Models
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Conclusion
Based on theory of clubs, a critical incentive compatibility criterion for self-management
groups of natural resources to sustain in the long run depends on whether or not managing
the resource as a group results in economic gains for its members. This paper uses a unique
set of data from South Korea and an empirical strategy to provide one of the first quantitative
evidences that self management is benefiting fishermen. Overall, we find that membership in
a self-management group benefits the member fishermen on both the revenue and cost sides
of fishery activities. Although statistical evidence of the actual levels of change is not as robust, we find consistent, strong evidence that at least self management of fisheries is leading
to increased revenue and decreased cost. These findings are encouraging indications that support the privileged condition for self-management groups to function as clubs.
However, these results do not necessarily paint a rosy picture of self management for
South Korea’s fisheries. Our finding merely supports the argument that member fishermen are not worse off. The finding that estimates of the impact on directional change
were more robust than the extent of the change, suggests that the process might still be
in progress in South Korea, and a longer timeframe may be necessary to observe a solid
trend of increasing profit. Given that the average age of self-management groups is only
about seven years, such an outcome is within one’s expectation, but it also means that
much more self-management effort is needed. Nonetheless, the majority of member fishermen perceive the change to be in the right direction, which suggests that members may
have the incentive to maintain the group status for the time being.
The results obtained in this study provide some policy implications for fishery self
management in South Korea and beyond. First, the results show that, on average, self
management of fisheries brings positive benefits not only to current members but potentially to all non-members. As such, this finding could support the argument for South
Korea’s government to continue its policy to promote and support the establishment and
operation of self-management groups. This seems particularly important at this juncture
where the positive trend is felt by many member fishermen, but tangible and measureable
impacts are yet to arrive. Thus, it would be a great loss of opportunity if the government
were to discontinue this endeavor.
Secondly, one statistic that stood out compared to other countries’ self-management
experience is the high share of South Korean self management dealing with finfish (figure
1). Both the theory and typical case studies, including those in Japan, point out that immobile species, such as shellfish and crustaceans, are more suited for self management
than mobile species (e.g., Ostrom et al. 2002).The ability to swim around makes the species potentially difficult to co-manage, since they can easily straddle across the border of
self-management groups. This implies that a self-management organization that administers an area large enough to cover the movement of such species becomes necessary for
effective management.
The challenge, of course, is that larger self-management groups are often difficult to
establish, let alone sustain. Common wisdom is that the smaller the group size, the more
likely its endurance (Olson 1965; Ostrom et al. 2002). In fact, South Korean self-management groups have fewer members (average of 71) than non-self management groups.
There will be a higher degree of heterogeneity, which could impede reaching any sensible
consensus on self-imposed rules and other cooperative arrangements. Political forces will
be much stronger, which could completely change the group’s direction (as seen in some
U.S. coastal fishery management; e.g., Gaines 2008; Murphy 2008).
In sum, there are advantages and disadvantages to enlarging the self-management
group: cover the entire migration path of managed finfish species but with the possibility
of increasing transaction costs among the members. A possible remedy is the coalition of
self-management groups, as seen in Japan (Uchida and Makino 2008). By utilizing the
pre-existing organizational hierarchy, it may be possible to keep transaction costs low.
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Figure 1. Proportion of the Primary Target Species Type, Members of
Self-management Groups vs. Non-members, 2007
Source: Authors’ data.

Thirdly, the extent and the types of self-management activities currently adopted by
self-management groups indicate that there is still significant room for further utilizing
advantages of self management. For example, the most popular self-management activities in our sample were cleaning fishing grounds, monitoring for poachers, removing
pests, and information exchange. Although all of these are important fishery management
activities, their impacts on enhancing total revenue or reducing costs are passive at best.
One of the key strengths of self management—and collective management in general—is
the ability to engage in activities that are ineffective if done individually but potentially
very effective if done as a group. Such an example is joint marketing and quality control.
In Japan, for example, more and more fishing cooperatives are starting their own
retail shops and internet sales.6 The concept is to cut the middleman and present their
products as the freshest available to a consumer. Since Japanese consumers are very selective about the freshness of fish, this method is fairly low-tech and yet quite effective to
differentiate their product from others. Similarly, South Korea’s self-management groups
may take advantage of these strategies to differentiate their products and increase sales.
Finally, in the survey sample there was only one case where the respondent mentioned revenue sharing. Unfortunately, we do not know the details of how this is actually
done, but it could be something very similar to what several studies have found in Japan
(Gaspart and Seki 2003; Platteau and Seki 2001; Seki 2000; Uchida and Baba 2008;
Uchida and Watanobe 2008). A pooling arrangement, as it is often termed, is recently
garnering attention from the theoretical front as well, with results generally being positive
about its effect on successful self management. The key driving force for this outcome is
the fact that a pooling arrangement aligns individual incentive (profit maximization) to
that of a group as a whole (maximize total profit).

Personal communication with Dr. Osamu Baba of Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology and
fishery cooperative association members.
6
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It will be difficult to convince fishermen to accept this regime. Even in Japan where
more than 20% of self-management groups have adopted a pooling arrangement, fishermen will typically resist its implementation initially. But some of those fishermen are
now doing fairly well, at least when one considers the environment in which they operate
(Uchida and Baba 2008; Uchida and Watanobe 2008).
The risk of a pooling arrangement is of course the prospect of free-riding. The lesson
from the Japanese experience, as is consistent with the Folk Theorem in game theory, is
that as a result of a pooling arrangement the members must be better off than without it.
In a repeated infinite game, any incentive compatible strategy can be supported as Nash
equilibrium. Thus, if it is the fishermen’s interest to maintain the pooling arrangement and
self-management group for the current period, then they will do so for all subsequent periods. Thus, we are back to our previous point, that self-management groups should put more
effort in direct profit enhancement (revenue increasing and/or cost reduction) activities.
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